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Between January, 1984 and September, 1985, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided over 311 criminal appeals. The first sec-
tion of this survey discusses significant developments concerning the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule of evidence as it relates
to the preliminary determination of statement admissibility. In-
dependent evidence, establishment of a conspiracy, quantum of
proof, and order of proof are also discussed.
The second section examines the entrapment defense and signifi-
cant developments concerning: (1) the availability of the defense, (2)
burden of proof and jury instructions, and (3) rebuttal of the entrap-
ment defense through the use of evidence of other defenses.
I. THE COCONSPIRATOR HEARSAY EXCEPTION
A. Introduction
The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule of evidence, is an
evidentiary rule which permits the use of certain out-of-court state-
ments by one criminal actor to be used against a coconspirator.2
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective in 1975,3
codify this exception in subdivision d of Rule 801.4
Federal common law recognized that statements of coconspirators
1. This rule will hereinafter be referred to as the "coconspirator hearsay
exception."
2. Courts, as well as commentators, have likened conspiracies to business part-
nerships in that the participants act in concert to achieve a desired end. As a result,
the courts view a party conspirator as having authorized all acts and declarations of a
coconspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See E. W. CLEARY.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267 (3d ed. 1984); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 57 (1978).
3. Act of Dec. 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1926.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801 of the Federal Rules provides in perti-
nent part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) Admission by a party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is . .
(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furlher-
ance of the conspiracy.
Id.
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were an exception to the hearsay rule in both civil5 and criminal law-
suits. 6 This doctrine was described at common law as, "[Any act or
declaration by one coconspirator committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy and during its pendency is admissible against each and
every coconspirator provided that a foundation for its reception is
laid by independent proof of the conspiracy." 7 A slight variation of
this rule was codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.8
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 essentially adopted the common law
rule with regard to the elements of "pendency" and "in furtherance
of" the conspiracy.9 It did not, however, codify the requirement of
independent foundation.10 Moreover, the adoption of Federal Rule
of Evidence 104,11 which governs preliminary questions of admissi-
5. At common law this doctrine was applied in civil cases. See South-East Coal
Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 779 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
983 (1971) (coconspirator hearsay exception applicable in civil anti-trust action).
6. Common law recognized this doctrine as applying to all types of joint ven-
tures. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 & n.6 (1974); Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953).
7. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy-A Reexamination of the Co-conspirator's Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (1954).
8. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
stated the following regarding the coconspirator exception:
The House approved the long-accepted rule that 'a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy' is not hearsay as it was submitted by the Supreme Court. While the rule
refers to a coconspirator, it is this committee's understanding that the rule is
meant to carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a joint ven-
turer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this rule even
though no conspiracy has been charged.
See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7051, 7073.
9. See Levie, supra note 7, at 1161.
10. The common law requirement of independent foundation was stated by the
Supreme Court in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942). Specifically, the
Glasser court held that the existence of a conspiracy must be proven by independent.
non-hearsay evidence before the coconspirator exception can be invoked; no "boot-
strapping" was allowed. Id. at 74-75.
11. Federal Rules of Evidence 104 provides:
Preliminary Questions
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancv of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon. or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other pre-
liminary matters shall be so condtwted when the interests ofjustice require
or, when an accused is a %%itness, if he so requests.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a)-(c).
[Vol. 12
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bility, has produced a majority12 and minority13 rule regarding the
requirement that independent proof must be presented to establish
the existence of a conspiracy before the coconspirator hearsay excep-
tion may be invoked. 14
12. The majority rule holds that evidence independent and exclusive of the state-
ment seeking admission pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E) must es-
tablish the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation therein. See
United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158-59 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088
(1982); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1044 (1982); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (11th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Magnuson, 680 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983)); United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982) (overruled by
United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984)); United States v. Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 930 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982);
United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 460 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir.
1978).
13. The minority rule holds that a trial judge may consider the coconspirator's
statement and other hearsay evidence to determine whether the jury should be per-
mitted to consider the coconspirator's statement during its deliberation. See United
States v. Guerro, 693 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Martorano, 557
F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United States v. Petroz-
ziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977).
14. A majority of the circuits adhere to the common law requirement that the
existence of a conspiracy must be proven by independent, non-hearsay evidence
before the coconspirator hearsay exception will be invoked. See supra note 10. How-
ever, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Fed. R. Evid. 104 permits a
judge to base his determinations regarding the admissibility of a coconspirator's
statement on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence. See id. For cases recognizing
this approach, see supra note 13.
Admissibility of coconspirator statements in government prosecutions heard in
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals requires that the following be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence: (1) demonstration of the existence of a conspiracy; (2)
wherein the defendant and the declarant were members; and (3) where the declara-
tion was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. For Eighth Circuit cases recognizing
this standard, see United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1271 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Le-
roux, 738 F.2d 943, 949 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jankowski, 713 F.2d 394,
396 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1051 (1984); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d
1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lambros, 564 F.2d 26, 30 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1975).
The quantum of proof required by the circuit courts to invoke the coconspirator
hearsay exception varies from circuit to circuit. Four standards are recognized: (1)
the conspiracy must be established by prima facie evidence; (2) once the existence of
a conspiracy has been established by the evidence presented in a preliminary pro-
ceeding, only slight evidence is required to demonstrate the defendant's participa-
tion in it; (3) the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) the existence of a con-
spiracy and the defendant's participation in it must be established by substantial evi-
dence. For a discussion concerning the application of these standards and the Eighth
Circuit's approach to required quantum of proof, see infra note 110.
19861
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B. Case Evaluations
During the Eighth Circuit's January, 1984 to September, 1985
term, the court decided nineteen cases involving evidence presented
for admission under the coconspirator hearsay exception.15 Among
those cases decided, the court faced compelling arguments against
the admissibility of such evidence in: United States v. Lewis 16 and
United States v. Johnson. 17
1. United States v. Lewis
In Lewis, R.A. Milburn was the central figure in two conspiracies: a
tax evasion conspiracyl8 and a narcotics distribution conspiracy.19
The tax evasion conspiracy involved two instances concerning the
admissibility of coconspirator evidence.
The first instance involved a "drug ledger" 20 which recorded drug
15. The Eighth Circuit decided the following cases during this time period:
United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Disbrow,
768 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1985);
Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259; United States v. Reda, 765 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. American Grain & Related Indus., 763 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1985); Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316; United States v.
Becton, 751 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fahnbulleh, 748 F.2d 473 (8th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Schepp, 746 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Resnick, 745 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Krevsky, 741 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Massa, 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Panas, 738 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.
1984); Leroux, 738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
16. 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985).
17. 767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985).
18. Milburn was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 848 for maintaining a "continuing
criminal enterprise" (CCE). Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1323. He was also convicted for con-
spiracy to commit tax fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole on the CCE charge and a concurrent five-year sentence
and a $10,000 fine on the tax fraud charge. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1323. Family cocon-
spirators in the tax fraud conspiracy included Milburn's parents, his sister, and
brother-in-law. As a result, his mother was sentenced to one year in prison and a
$2,000 fine; his father was sentenced to three years in prison and a $10,00 fine; his
brother-in-law was sentenced to one year in prison; and his sister was sentenced to
fours years in prison and given a $5,000 fine. Id.
19. Three of Milburn's associate conspirators were convicted of cocaine distribu-
tion and conspiracy charges in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Each of the associate
conspirators were given two consecutive ten-year terms of imprisonment, a six-year
term of imprisonment, and a five-year term of imprisonment with a $5,000 fine.
Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1323.
20. A "drug ledger" is an accounting record of drug finances. The information
contained in this ledger included names, dollar figures, and telephone numbers.
This information was used to maintain the conspirators' continued smuggling activi-
ties and to maintain accurate records of the purchase of drugs and the concealment
of taxable income. Id. at 1338-39.
[Vol. 12
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finances of the conspirators.21 One page of this ledger, entitled
"Paula," apparently listed approximately $100,000 which was dis-
bursed to two of the conspirators22 for purchasing and improving
one conspirator's home as well as the defendant's parents' home.
2 3
When this evidence was presented at trial, counsel for the conspira-
tors objected, arguing that it was inadmissible hearsay, 24 since the
conspirator who kept these records, Ms. Martin,2 5 was not named in
the action and had died prior to the commencement of this action.26
The court disposed of these arguments by holding that, although
Martin was an unnamed coconspirator, this evidence was admissible
because each of the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E)27 had been met.28 The existence of a conspiracy was
demonstrated by correspondence between Martin and Milburn,2
9
which established "a likelihood of illicit association between the de-
clarant and the defendant." 30 This evidence31 also established that
21. Id. at 1338. The government relied heavily upon these records to substanti-
ate the conspirators' purchase of drugs and the concealment of the conspirators' tax-
able income for tax fraud purposes. Id.
22. According to the "Paula" ledger page, the $100,000 disbursement was made
to family conspirators Paula and Ron Throop. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1338.
23. Id.
24. Id. The family's counsel also argued that this key evidence was never authen-
ticated. The Eighth Circuit, however, held that the genuineness of this document
had been sufficiently authenticated by circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Ac-
cord United States v. De Gudino, 722 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (approving
admission of lists of information regarding the smuggling of illegal aliens; contents
of the lists provided prima facie evidence that they were written by someone involved
in the smuggling conspiracy and were seized from the operation's headquarters);
United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 645 (8th Cir.) (genuineness of writing can be
established by circumstantial proof without resort to handwriting or typewriting),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
25. Martin was the girlfriend of Milburn. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1338-39.
26. Id. at 1338.
27. For the text of FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) see supra note 3.
28. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1338-39. The common law standard to which the court
referred is that the government must demonstrate that:
(1) a conspiracy existed;
(2) defendant and declarant were both members of the conspiracy;
and
(3) the declaration was made during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
Id. "In establishing the existence of a conspiracy, the government must only demon-
strate 'a likelihood of illicit association between the declarant and the defendant.' "
Id. at 339 (citing United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.), cer. denied,
434 U.S. 940 (1977)).
29. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1339. This correspondence was written by both parties
while Ross A. Milburn had been incarcerated in Arkansas on a marijuana charge. Id.
30. Id. This standard for the establishment of the existence of a conspiracy was
set out in Scholle, 553 F.2d at 1117.
31. The court stated that other independent evidence also supported the exist-
ence of the conspiracy and these parties' membership in it. Lewis. 759 F.2d at 1339.
1986]
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Martin and Milburn were members of the conspiracy.32
The court held that the "Paula" page of the ledger was made in
the course of the conspiracy because evidence demonstrated its au-
thenticity.33 Finally, the court held that the "Paula" page was used
in furtherance of the conspiracy because accounting records are es-
sential even for "[a] criminal enterprise's continued vitality; without
accurate bookkeeping, the purchase of drugs and concealment of
taxable income could not have continued."34
The second instance involving the tax evasion conspiracy con-
cerned evidence of a conversation between two conspirators in the
presence of nonconspirators.3 5 This conversation was admitted into
evidence by a nonconspirator3 6 who recalled Paula Throop discuss-
ing with her husband a conversation between Ross E. Milburn and
Alan Milburn.37 While Throop explained this conversation as relat-
ing to a "family business,"38 its real effect was to attempt to shelter
drug sales money through the purchase of real property.39 The co-
conspirators objected to the admission of this evidence as "triple
hearsay."40
Again, in disposing of the coconspirators' argument, the court
held that evidence regarding these statements was admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).41 The court held that the
existence of a conspiracy and the couples' participation in it was es-
32. Id.
33. Id. The authenticating evidence involved the fact that the figures written in
the ledger correlated with property expenditures. These entries were dated and five
annotated entries tied these entries to the property expenditures made by Paula and
Ron Throop. The death of Debbie Martin refuted any suggestion that the "Paula"
page could have been composed after the expiration of the conspiracy. Id.
34. Id. AccordDe Gudino, 722 F.2d at 1356 (lists, consisting of names of smuggled
aliens and their sponsors as well as records of payments, were admissible as cocon-
spirator statements where contents of the lists clearly showed that their author was
familiar with the workings of the conspiracy, fact that lists contained dates and
records of payments was evidence that they were written during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and names and other information were evidence that
the lists were utilized to maintain information necessary to continue the conspiracy).
35. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1339.
36. Charles Goodale and his wife, who were casual friends of Paula and Ronald
Throop, overheard Paula Throop discuss with her husband a phone call she had re-
ceived from Ross E. Milburn. In this conversation Ross E. Milburn told Paula that
Alan Milburn had directed him to purchase highway frontage lots (in an effort to
shelter drug sales money). Id.
37. Id.
38. Paula Throop explained to the Goodales that the conversation related to a
"family business" engaged in real estate speculation. Id. at 1339-40.
39. Id. at 1340.
40. Id.
41. Id. See supra notes 4, 14, and 28.
[Vol. 12
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tablished by circumstantial evidence.42 The court record reflected
that the conspiracy was fully functioning before the Throops' and
Goodales' visit on the evening in question.43 Also, contrary to the
coconspirators' contentions, Marion Milburn's failure to be impli-
cated in the conspiracy until after Throop's statement to the
Goodales did not bar admission of this evidence because the court
had previously observed that "one charged with conspiracy may not
avoid criminal responsibility by merely having had the fortuity or
foresight to join a clearly illegal venture sometime after agreement
concerning its objective was reached."44 Finally, the court held that
Throop's statement appeared to have been made in furtherance of
the conspiracy,45 since it gave Ronald Throop explanations as to the
new developments and progress of the conspiracy.46
In Lewis, the court also decided the admissibility of evidence con-
42. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1340. The circumstantial evidence referred to by the court
is as follows:
Ross E. Milburn had apparently taken steps in 1976 to conceal his son's
property interest in his own home by changing the title from "Alan Milburn
and Deborah L. Martin Milburn, his wife" to "Ross Milburn and Debra L.
Martin, as joint tenants." According to stipulation, Ross E. Milburn also
signed the new deed and assumed the mortgage in his name. In 1977, the
Milburns worked a similar arrangement regarding Alan Milburn's truck,
which was titled under "Ross Milburn." In March, 1978, [Ross E.] Milburn
wrote Debbie Martin a letter confirming his involvement in the real estate
business and telling her, "Paula and Ron will need money. So give them
what they ask for." At about the same time as the conversation with the
Goodales, the Throops and Ross E. Milburn conferred with their tax advisor
about the tax consequences of constructing their home with cash, which led
to the formation of the Creative Builders and P & R bank accounts. Shortly
after this meeting, in April 1978, the couples began purchasing lots in con-
formity with [Ross E.] Milburn's plan.
Id. For cases recognizing the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the existence
of a conspiracy and the parties' participation in the conspiracy, see Glasser, 315 U.S. at
80 (a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a development and collection
of circumstances); Leroux, 738 F.2d at 950 (independent evidence established a
course of action).
43. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1340.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Heater, 689 F.2d 783, 788 (8th Cir. 1982)). See
Leroux, 738 F.2d at 949-50.
45. In evaluating the "in furtherance of" requirement, the court will consider the
nature of the statement as well as the time and circumstances under which it was
made. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1340. See United States v. Handy, 668 F.2d 407, 408 (8th
Cir. 1982).
46. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1340-41. The court went on to state: "[w]e have previ-
ously found that statements of explanation which reveal the progress of the conspir-
acy are made in furtherance of it." Id. at 1340; see also Massa, 740 F.2d at 638
(statements made were in furtherance of the conspiracy since they were made to
other participants in the scheme and either explained events important to the con-
spiracy or gave directions to facilitate it); Handy, 668 F.2d at 408 (statements made,
clearly helped identify the role of one coconspirator to another; not only was the
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cerning two instances of coconspirator statements and distribution
of narcotics. The first instance involved a recorded conversation be-
tween Ross A. Milburn and Ron Humphries in which Milburn re-
ferred to an individual named Terry Crafton.47 While Crafton
agreed that the government's evidence may have established a con-
spiracy, he argued that none of this evidence established his partici-
pation in it.48
In refuting this argument, the court recognized that admissibility
of the taped conversation was without error because the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) had been met. 49
The conspiracy's existence had been aptly established, the court
said, through circumstantial evidence already presented.50 In addi-
tion, Crafton's membership in the conspiracy was established
through his participation in the buying of cocaine on several occa-
sions from various alleged members of the conspiracy.51
Crafton argued that the admitted52 statements were not made dur-
ing the course of the conspiracy because by this time the focus of the
conspiracy had changed to attempting to conceal the extent of the
group's drug dealing and, therefore, no conspiracy existed in which
to connect him.53 The court disposed of this argument by stating
that adequate evidence54 had been presented to demonstrate that




51. Id. The special events which led the court to the determination that Terry
Crafton was a member of the conspiracy are as follows:
Michael Richmond testified that in February, 1980, with Gary Darnall, he
and [Ross A.] Milburn met Crafton in Memphis and sold him twelve ounces
of cocaine. Richmond also testified that Milburn had doubted the trustwor-
thiness of one of his salesmen and had decided to deal directly with Crafton
in his place. Mark McClellan testified that he drove to Kennett, Missouri, in
August, 1980, and gave a bulky envelope weighing several ounces to
Crafton in exchange for an envelope filled with cash. McClellan also testi-
fied that he had planned to meet Crafton in December, 1980, to deliver an-
other bulky envelope, but Crafton did not appear . . . Crafton's telephone
records also corroborate his link to [Ross A.] Milburn by confirming that
calls were made on the day of the aborted cocaine sale with McClellan.
Thus, the evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of a conspiracy of
which Crafton was a member.
Id.
52. The taped conversation which was challenged as being hearsay occurred in
April of 1981. Id. at 1334.
53. Id.
54. Id. The evidence the court relied on concerning this issue is as follows:
Crafton was receiving deliveries until August, 1980, and had planned to re-
ceive a delivery in December, 1980. In addition, other recorded conversa-
tions confirm that [Ross A.] Milburn had two pounds of cocaine ready for
sale in February, that he had changed some of his personnel and purchased
a "company car," and that he was planning the biggest deal of the year.
[Vol. 12
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the conspiracy was actively functioning and its members were mak-
ing future business plans until at least the time of the challenged
conversation.55 Furthermore, since the evidence presented at trial
gave no indication of Crafton's or of his coconspirator's withdrawal,
there was no indication that the drug conspiracy had ended.56
Finally, the court held that the challenged statements were made
in furtherance of the conspiracy even though they were made during
the concealment phase of the conspiracy.57 The court held that
"logic and authority support our decision to admit the evidence...
[since] in this case . . . the conspiracy was a series of loosely knit
transactions between a changing cast of members, [and the court
could not] pinpoint when [the conspiracy] may have ended, other
than when its members were arrested."58
The second instance involving coconspirator statements and the
distribution of narcotics also involved the challenge of a taped con-
versation. This conversation was between Ross A. Milburn and Ron
Humphries5 9 about associate conspirator Gary Darnall.60 While
Darnall did not contest the existence of a conspiracy and his partici-
pation in it,61 he contended that since the challenged statements
Id.
55. Id. The court went on to note that other courts have recognized that conspir-
acies of this sort are deemed to exist until they are actually terminated:
[Wihere a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued
performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been an affirma-
tive showing that it has terminated, and its members continue to be conspir-
ators until there has been an affirmative showing that they have withdrawn.
Id. (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1117 (1983)). See also United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir.
1979) (cessation of activities is not enough to constitute withdrawal from a conspir-
acy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980).
56. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1343.
57. Id. Contra Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970) (the hearsay exception
that allows evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted
against his fellow conspirators does not apply during subsequent periods when the
conspirators are engaged in nothing more than concealment of the criminal enter-
prise); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 616 (1953); Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949).
58. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1343. See also United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 23 (2d
Cir. 1979) (statement made to allay suspicion of investigator admitted as being in
furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082 (1980); United States v. Del
Valle, 587 F.2d 699, 703-04 (5th Cir.) (where conspiracy was not aimed at accom-
plishing a single objective with a precise moment of termination but had continuing
series of objectives, acts of concealment were parts of a continuing activity that was
essential to and therefore in furtherance of the survival of an on-going operation).
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
59. Ron Humphries became a government informant and visited Ross A. Mil-
burn wearing a microphone to record their conversations. Lewis. 759 F.2d at 1346.
60. Id.
61. These requirements were established through circumstantial evidence. Id.
1986]
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took place after the last overt act of the conspiracy, 62 these state-
ments were outside of the coconspirator hearsay exception. The
statements therefore, were not made in the course of the
conspiracy.
6 3
The court disposed of this argument by recognizing that a conspir-
acy expires after the last overt act committed during the existence of
the conspiracy. 64 The court went on to hold that it "was satisfied,
from direct and circumstantial evidence, that the conspiracy func-
tioned at least through the April 10, 1981, conversation." 6 5 Conse-
quently, the "in the course of the conspiracy" requirement had been
met.
6 6
Darnall further contended that the conspiracy had been termi-
nated by remarks made during the challenged conversations, thereby
taking them out of the coconspirator hearsay exception.67 Aside
from finding that this argument was inconsistent with Darnall's origi-
nal position, 6 8 the court held that this evidence did not "rise to the
threshold necessary to establish a bona fide withdrawal from the con-
spiracy."69 Stronger evidence of termination was not produced,
62. Darnall argued that the duration of a conspiracy is determined by the last
overt act of the conspirators. Further, since the indictment stated that this act oc-
curred on February 10, 1982, and this date was before the challenged statements had
been made, these statements were hearsay and not admissible. Id. at 1347.
63. Id.
64. Id. See Fiswick v. United States , 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
65. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1347. The direct and circumstantial evidence specifically
relied upon by the court included the following:
Although no evidence confirms actual cocaine distribution after February
11, [ 1981 ] ample evidence demonstrates a pattern of continued activity akin
to the pattern of transactions alleged in Count II of the indictment (particu-
larly [Ross A.] Milburn's efforts to "recruit, organize, supervise, manage,
and terminate conspiracy personnel and [Ross A.] Milburn's travels and
meetings with coconspirators"). On March 12, 1981 [Ross A.] Milburn's
brown Pontiac Bonneville (which he described to Humphries as his "com-
pany car") was seen in Fort Lauderdale, parked in front of Darnall's home.
A month later, on April 10, 1981, Darnall was seen in Sikeston, driving the
1977 Thunderbird which Darnall and [Ross A.] Milburn had purchased with
cash in Michael Richmond's name for transporting cocaine. In addition, tel-
ephone toll records through April, 1981, prove regular and extensive con-
tact between [Ross A.] Milburn, Darnall, Crafton and Ralph Ed Purdy.
Id. at 1348.
66. Id.
67. Id. Darnall suggested that Milburn's remark of: "Hey, we've quit. Gary and I
have decided to lock it up," showed the termination of the conspiracy. Id.
68. The court held that this argument would urge the admission of hearsay evi-
dence to prove the inadmissibility of the challenged hearsay evidence. The court
concluded that this suggestion was without merit. Id.
69. Id. The court went on to state that in order for a conspirator to effectively
withdraw from a conspiracy, "the defendant must demonstrate 'that he took affirma-
tive action to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy . . . . The [mere
cessation of the activity in furtherance of the conspiracy does not constitute with-
drawal.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1983));
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therefore, this conspiracy was presumed to have continued until
there was an affirmative showing of termination.70
With regard to whether the challenged statements were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy, Darnall suggested that since Hum-
phries had become a government informant when these conversa-
tions had taken place, Humphries could not have conspired with
Milburn when the two talked and, therefore, the remarks could not
have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 7' The court re-
futed this argument, stating "the fact that one conspirator allies him-
self with the government has no effect on the continuing
conspiratorial efforts of his former associates who remain at large."72
Furthermore, the court held that where the other coconspirators
could still perpetuate the on-going conspiracy, their statements to an
informant are admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception,
even when the arrested conspirator is acting under surveillance and
direction of government agents to obtain evidence against the co-
conspirators.73 Since the remarks7 4 made in the taped conversations
helped to maintain trust and cohesiveness between the conspirators
see also Boyd, 610 F.2d at 528 (the defendant has the burden of demonstrating his
withdrawal in a manner reasonably calculated to reach the coconspirators); United
States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975)
(members continue to be conspirators until there has been an affirmative showing
that they have withdrawn (citing United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951, 964 (6th
Cir. 1970)).
70. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1347; see also Va 'es, 512 F.2d at 642-43 (where conspiracy
contemplates continuity of purpose and continued performance of acts, it is pre-
sumed to exist until there has been affirmative showing that it has terminated and its
members continue to be conspirators until there has been affirmative showing that
they have withdrawn).
71. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1348.
72. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 600 F.2d 149, 153 (8th Cir. 1979)).
73. Id. (citing Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1269); accord United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d
847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (statements made by coconspirators who were not aware of
the arrest of one of their group and intended to further the conspiracy, are admissi-
ble under the conspiracy hearsay exception) (citing United States v. Bennett, 409
F.2d 888, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Williams, 548 F.2d 228, 231 (8th
Cir. 1977) (the test is not the arrest of some of the conspirators, but whether the
remaining conspirators are able to continue with the conspiracy).
74. The remarks relied upon by the cotrt include the following:
The February 6 and 11 conversations undoubtedly include admissible [re-
marks] .. . Humphries and [Ross A.] Milburn discussed personnel
problems with certain members of the cocaine ring, the availability and qual-
ity of up to two pounds of cocaine. and the possibility of Humphries work-
ing for [Ross A.] Milburn in exchange for debt forgiveness. On April 10.
[Ross A.] Milburn allays Humphries' fears about the DEA investigation and
details his efforts to evade detection. He instructs Humphries to keep silent
when he goes before the grand jury, and reminds him that the entire group
has agreed to remain silent, thereby attempting to preserve the cohesiveness
of the group.
Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1348.
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and tended to inform the members of the conspiracy's current status,
the court held that these statements were in furtherance of the con-
spiracy and were, therefore, admissible.75
2. United States v. Johnson
Johnson76 involved a conspiracy to transport a stolen automobile
from Oklahoma to Missouri.77 The conspirators affixed new vehicle
identification numbers in Missouri and falsely titled it in
Oklahoma.78
The specific evidence objected to as hearsay was a taped conversa-
tion79 amongst coconspirators, Charles Bailey, Leonard Breedlove,
and Ronald Schlup.80 Bailey and Breedlove advised Schlup on how
to "retag"81 vehicles.82 The court held that the recorded conversa-
tion was not admissible against coconspirators Lee Morgan and Mor-
ris Johnson under the coconspirator heresay exception.83 The court
further held, however, that the admission of this conversation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the tape was cumula-
75. Id.; see also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1983) (state-
ments between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and
cohesiveness among them or to inform each other of the current status of the con-
spiracy furthers the ends of the conspiracy and are admissible as long as the other
requirements of Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) are met), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United
States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981) (statements of reassurance fur-
ther a conspiracy).
76. 767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1263. The concealment and illegal transport of this vehicle was in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 and 2314-2315 (1982).
78. Id.
79. This conversation took place on January 29, 1982. Id. at 1271.
80. Id. Schlup was a paid informant. The FBI set up an undercover operation in
Lebanon, Missouri where Schlup and FBI Agent Richard Rindt ran a salvage yard
that would presumably be used to refit stolen cars. Id. at 1264.
81. The court described "retagging" as follows:
A salvage vehicle and title are purchased and the small metal vehicle inden-
tification number (VIN) plate is removed from the vehicle. The salvage title
is then processed through a state with lax titling requirements so that a non-
salvage title is issued. This processing is termed 'title washing." Shortly
after the salvage vehicle is obtained, a car is stolen that matches the vehicle
and washed title as to engine size, upholstry, color and accessories. The
characters on the salvage VIN and washed title will thus closely correspond
to the appearance of the stolen car. [he tre VIN is removed from the sto-
len car and replaced with the salvage VIN. Derivative VINs are ground off
the motor, transmission, and frame. and new derivative numbers that match
the salvage VIN are stamped over the old numbers. Once a stolen car has
been retagged the stolen car appears to be legitimate.
Id. at 1263-64.
82. Id. at 1271. This taped conversation had been played for the jury. Id.
83. Id. at 1271. Although Morgan and Johnson were not participants in the
taped conversation, they were ie defendants who objected to the admissibility of
this evidence. Id. at 1272.
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tive concerning advice about the tags.84
Conspirators Morgan and Johnson argued that these statements
were inadmissible hearsay because the duration of a conspiracy is
limited by the indictment.85 The indictment stated that the conspir-
acy did not commence until on or about February 3, 1982. The
taped conversation occurred on January 29, 1982. The conspirators
argued, therefore, that these conversations were outside the scope of
the coconspirator hearsay exception.8 6 The court found that the in-
dictment was not dispositive of a conspiracy's duration because the
coconspirator hearsay exception can be invoked even when the de-
fendants have not been charged with conspiracy.
87
In turn, the government argued that evidence of the taped conver-
sation was admissible because January 29th was "on or about" Feb-
ruary 3rd and the conversation, therefore, was within the duration of
the conspiracy.88 The court rejected this argument, recognizing that
statements made before the existence of a conspiracy do not fall
within the coconspirator hearsay exception.89 Furthermore, the
court stated that the government failed to produce any independent
evidence that a conspiracy actually existed on or before January 29,
1982.90 Consequently, the taped conversation was inadmissible
hearsay, but the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.9 1
84. Id. at 1271. The court went on to hold that this evidence was harmless be-
cause no proper objection was made to the question and answer given concerning
retagging. The challenged conversation mentioned neither of the objecting defend-
ants. Id. at 1271-72.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; accord Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1339 (the defendants need not be charged with
conspiracy to invoke the coconspirator hearsay rule).
88. Johnson, 767 F.2d at 1271.
89. Id. (citing Leroux, 738 F.2d at 949 (coconspirator statements made before the
inception of the conspiracy do not fall within the coconspirator hearsay exception));
accord United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830. 840 (7th Cir. 1983) ("statements by cocon-
spirators made either before formation of conspiracy or after its termination are no[
admissible under coconspirator hearsay exception"); United States v. Tombrello.
666 F.2d 485, 490 (11 th Cir.) (statements before inception of conspiracy do not fall
within the exception), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982); United States v. Vaught, 485
F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1973) (statements prior to formation of conspiracy irrele-
vant); cf. Brown v. United States, 150 U.S. 93, 98 (1893) (declarations are admissible
under the conspiracy exception only when made while conspiracy pending).
90. Johnson, 767 F.2d at 1271. l'he court inferred, however. that had the govern-
ment presented adequate independent proof that an "illegal plan" involvingJohnson
and Morgan had existed prior to February 3, 1982, this evidence may have been
deemed admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Id. The case which
used the "illegal plan" standard fo determination of independent evidence substan-
tiating the existence of a conspiracy is Leroux, 738 F.2d at 950.
91. Johnson, 767 F.2d at 1271-72.
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C. Circuit Court Comparison
Analysis of the preceding Eighth Circuit decisions in light of other
circuit court decisions reveals some confusion surrounding the
coconspirator hearsay exception. Application of this exception has
created areas of consensus and significant disagreement.
1. Preliminary Determination of Admissibility--a Question of Law
The circuits generally agree that, unlike the common law trend,
where the jury had the ultimate decision of determining whether
coconspirator statements were admissible,92 Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 10493 requires that the preliminary determination concerning
coconspirator statement admissibility is a question for the court.9 4
While neither Lewis nor Johnson specifically agreed with this analysis,
the Eighth Circuit approved of this change in role in United States v.
Bell.95 This application of Rule 104 is well founded because the jury
is not competent to determine whether the exception applies.96
92. At common law, thejury played the prominent role in deciding coconspirator
statement admissibility. Specifically, if the judge was satisfied that the government
had presented sufficient independent evidence to support a finding by the jury that
the alleged conspiracy existed and the declarant and defendant against who the state-
ment was offered were members of the conspiracy, then the jury was instructed to
consider the hearsay against that particular defendant if it first found: (1) the conspir-
acy existed; (2) the declarant and defendant were members of the conspiracy; and (3)
the statement was one made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States
v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d
156, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1973).
93. See supra note 11.
94. United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 789-90 (2d Cir.) (the court, not
the jury, determines the admissibility of hearsay statements), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945
(1982); United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d 1337, 1342 (1981); Gantt, 617 F.2d at 844
(court determines whether requisite evidence is produced); De Mier v. United States,
616 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980) (court determines admissibility); United States v.
Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 157 (6th Cir.) (Rule 104 requires judge to make determina-
tion of admissibility), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979); Continental Group, 603 F.2d at
456; United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063. 1065 (4th Cir. 1976) (admissibility
determined by judge).
95. 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978). In Bell, the court recognized the subtle but
significant changes Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) caused in the coconspirator hearsay area. The
court stated: "[tihis shift in the relative functions of the judge and jury has occa-
sioned a reevaluation of the level and type of proof necessary to demonstrate a de-
fendant's involvement in a coconspirator's statement." Id. at 1043.
96. The complexity of the coconspirator hearsay doctrine is exemplified by the
fact that a determination of the exception's applicability to a particular situation re-
quires the analyzer to weigh and assess the evidence presented as the evidence re-
lates to the issue of whether the statement is admissible under the exception.
Notably, however, this inquiry must be kept separate and distinct from the prelimi-
nary issue whether independent non-hearsay evidence has established the conspir-
acy's existence in the first place. For a detailed discussion concerning the shilt of
judge and jury functions regarding questions of admissibility. see Mueller, The Federal
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The courts also concur on the use of independent evidence in es-
tablishing the existence of a conspiracy. A majority of the circuits
adhere to the common law doctrine 97 which requires that independ-
ent evidence must be used to establish the existence of a conspiracy
and the defendant's involvement before statements of a cocon-
spirator will be admissible.9 8 Both Lewis and Johnson demonstrate the
Eighth Circuit's adherence to this principle.99
b. Minority View
The First Circuit has suggested that coconspirator statements
which have not been admitted into evidence may be considered in
determining whether a conspiracy exists.lOO The First Circuit's posi-
tion is based on an exempting phrase in Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a), which states that trial judges are not bound by rules of evi-
dencelOl when they are deciding questions of admissibility.102
Of the two views regarding independent evidence, the common
law approach is more principled. A fundamental aspect of the com-
mon law approach is the recognition that a coconspirator's state-
ment, standing alone, should not be allowed to establish its own
provenance.' 03 Independent proof should be required so that reli-
ance on the coconspirator statements themselves will not create a
"slippery slope"104 which erodes and eventually destroys a need for
corroboration.
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 366-70
(1984). See also Comment, Evolution of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay' Rule in
the Federal Courts, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 617, 624-28 (1981).
97. See supra note 10.
98. See supra note 12.
99. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1342;Johnson. 767 F.2d at 1271.
100. See, e.g., Guerro, 693 F.2d at 12. Hearsay is admissible "if it is more likely than
not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the
hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the con-
spiracy .. " Id. (citing FED. R. Evn). 801(d)(2)(E)).
101. Trial judges are not bound to the Federal Rules of Evidence except regard-
ing privileges in making their determinations concerning admissibility of cocon-
spirator hearsay statements. See FED. R. Evil). § 104(a). See generally MCCORMICK.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 53 (E. Cleary ed. 1978).
102. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
103. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75: United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 & n.14
(1974).
104. "Slippery slope" is a term of art which is used to connote that the eflicacy of a
court's rules are gradually being destroyed by the cumulaion of exceptions.
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c. Quantum of Proof
Circuit courts also disagree as to the required quantum of proof
once a conspiracy has been established. At present, the circuit courts
have applied four views. First, is the view that the conspiracy must
be established by prima facie evidence before statements of a cocon-
spirator, made during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy, may be admitted against the defendant.105 Second, some courts
recognize that the defendant's participation in the conspiracy may be
established by "slight" evidence presented in a preliminary hear-
ing.Io6 Third, and most prominent, is the view that the preliminary
issues concerning the existence of a conspiracy and of the defend-
ant's participation in it must be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.107 A relatively new trend has developed in this area
and comprises a fourth view. Some circuits hold that a conspiracy
and a defendant's participation in it must be established by substan-
tial evidence. 108
d. Order of Proof
Each circuit has recognized the district court's discretion to allow
coconspirator statements to be introduced before the existence of
the conspiracy and the defendant's participation has been estab-
lished.109 The specific procedures used by each circuit to address
105. For decisions recognizing the prima facie evidence standard, see United
States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d
147, 153 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978).
106. For decisions recognizing the "slight" evidence standard, see United States
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1219 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United
States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 964 (10th Cir. 1978).
107. For decisions recognizing the preponderance of the evidence standard, see
Legato, 682 F.2d at 183; United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 999 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Grassi, 616 F.2d at 1300: United States v. Petersen, 611
F.2d 1313, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 1979): United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642. 644
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. De Fillipo, 590 F.2d 1228,
1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Enright. 579 F.2d
980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978); 3loiorano. 557 F.2d at 11.
108. For decisions recognizing the substantial evidence standard, see Ganit. 617
F.2d at 845; Stroupe, 538 F.2d at 1065.
109. See United States v. Rodri-liez. 689 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1982) (before the
jury can hear testimony under the coconspirator hearsay exception the trial court
must believe that there is substantial independent evidence of a conspiracy between
the defendant and the declarant and that the statements were uttered in furtherance
of that conspiracy); United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d I 169. 1175 (7th Cir.) (evidence
of presence, suspicious behavior. and significant prior dealings was stflicient in-
dependent circumstantial evidence when viewed in light most flavorable to the gov-
ernment, established by a preponderance of' tie evidence dat defkndats
participated in conspiracy to distribtie cocaine: hearsay slatements of, coconspirat ors
were admissible in prosecution of delendant for violation of federal narcotics laws).
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this question vary., 10 The Eighth Circuit, in Bell, set forth the proce-
dures to be followed by its district courts. I The court may condi-
tionally admit an out-of-court statement subject to the prosecutor's
ability to prove the statements of conspiracy by a preponderance of
independent evidence."12
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); Gantt, 617 F.2d at 845 (to avoid what may become a
separate trial on the issue of admissibility, the court may admit declarations of cocon-
spirators subject to connection to the conspiracy).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 962 (11 th Cir.) (district court
admitted statements subject to government's promise to connect them up by laying a
proper foundation for the statements during the course of the trial), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 856 (1982); United States v.Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dis-
trict court can admit statements subject to connection or the judge may hold a "mini-
trial" out of the jury's presence to determine whether the government will present
sufficient evidence of the conspiracy to the jury); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d
149, 152-53 (6th Cir.) (acceptable methods judges may use to determine admissibility
of hearsay include: (1) holding a mini-hearing where the court hears the govern-
ment's proof of conspiracy and makes the preliminary finding; if the hearsay is found
admissible, the case including the hearsay is presented to the jury; (2) the judge may
require the government to meet its initial burden by producing the non-hearsay evi-
dence of conspiracy first then requiring proof regarding the conspiracy's existence,
defendant's membership in the conspiracy and establishment that the statement was
made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy; or (3) the judge may admit
the hearsay subject to later demonstration of its admissibility by a preponderance of
the evidence), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1979); Andrews, 585 F.2d at 964-65 (acts and
declarations of one coconspirator are admissible against another if the existence of a
conspiracy is first established by independent evidence if the acts and declarations
occurred in furtherance of conspiracy); Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1131 (trial judge has
option of conditionally admitting coconspirator's declaration before conspiracy has
been independently established but subject to subsequent fulfillment of that critical
condition; in event of such failure, mistrial may be required and even if not, an in-
struction for jury to disregard coconspirator's declaration should be given); United
States v. depeda-Santana, 569 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (5th Cir.) (trial court did not err
by conditionally admitting hearsay testimony without prior establishment of conspir-
acy by independent evidence or in absence of request by the defendant by failing to
give cautionary jury instruction), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States x.
McCormick, 565 F.2d 286, 289 n.5 (4th Cir.) (district court may, in its discretion,
admit statements of coconspirators prior to proof of conspiracy, subject to being
connected up and followed by evidence of existence of conspiracy), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1021 (1977); Lambros, 564 F.2d at 30 (the trial judge determining preliminary
admissibility has wide discretion and must only be satisfied that there is independent
evidence, credible and sufficient to support a finding of a joint undertaking the in-
dependent evidence may be completely circtmstantial or may consist of the conspira-
tor's own conduct and admissions) (citing Siolle. 553 F.2d at 1117); Petrozzeillo. 548
F.2d at 23 (ifjudge determines it is more likely than not that declarant and defendant
were members of the conspiracy when hearsay statement was made and that state-
ment was in furtherance of the conspiracy. the hearsay is admissible).
111. Bell, 573 F.2d at 1044.
112. In Bell the court stated the procedure as follows:
(1) If the prosecutor propotnds a question which oliously requires a wit-
ness to recount an out-ofcouurt declaration of an alleged coconspirator, the
court, upon a timely and appropriate objection by the dckndant, may con-
19861
17
Hatcher: Criminal Procedure: Significant 1985 Developments
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEWV
In light of the diverse standards interpreting Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(a)(2)(E), the Eighth Circuit has adeptly waded through
the confusion. The Eighth Circuit has chosen to modify the common
law requisites concerning standards of proof and preliminary ques-
tions of coconspirator statement admissibility.'13 In so doing, the
Eighth Circuit has adopted the majority view. The majority view,
however, is not applied uniformly. Lack of uniformity is demon-
strated by the diverse standards recognized by the circuits concern-
ing independent evidence and (1) the establishment of a conspiracy's
existence, (2) quantum of proof, and (3) order of proof. This lack of
uniformity is detrimental to defendants faced with over-zealous pros-
ecutors who view this trend as fostering an atmosphere of easy con-
victions through the prospect of bootstrapping, that is, using the
hearsay statement to prove the existence of the conspiracy. Before
any uniform modifications can be effectuated, however, either the
Supreme Court should once again intervene and give the federal cir-
cuit courts guidance, or each of the federal circuit courts should reas-
sess the theoretical functions of this exception and define what they
expect the coconspirator hearsay exception to accomplish.
II. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
A. Introduction
Entrapment is a criminal defense used to protect defendants
ditionally admit the statement. At the same time, the court should, on the
record, caution the parties
(a) that the statement is being admitted subject to defendant's objec-
tion;
(b) that the government will be required to prove by a preponderance
of the independent evidence that the statement was made by a coconspirator
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy;
(c) that at the conclusion of all the evidence the court will make an
explicit determination for the record regarding the admissibility of the state-
ment; and
(d) that if the court determines that the government has failed to carry
the burden delineated in (b) above, the court will, upon appropriate motion.
declare a mistrial unless a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard the
statement will suffice to cure anyv prejudice. (citation omitted).
The foregoing procedural steps should transpire out of the hearing of the jury. See
FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
(2) After a ruling on the record that the out-of-court declaration is admis-
sible under Rule 801 (d)(2)(E), the court mav submit the case to the jury.
The court should not charge the jury on the admissibility of the cocon-
spirator's statement, but should, of course, instruct that the government is
required to prove the ultimate guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. An appropriate instruction on credibility should be given and the
jury should be cautioned with regard to the %%eight and credibility to be ac-
corded a coconspirator's statement.
Bell, 573 F.2d at 1044.
113. Prior to enactment of Rule 801 (d)(2)(E). the jury was given the dtuty to deter-
mine whether a conspiracy existed and if the defendant was a participant in it.
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against law enforcement activities which seek to secure criminal pros-
ecutions by inducing the commission of criminal offenses. 14
The early federal court of appeals decision of Woo Wai v. United
States, 15 recognized the entrapment defense. The Supreme Court
has since adopted this defense, 16 in an effort to curb the "manufactur-
ing of'1 17 illegal activity by law enforcement authorities.I1 8 The de-
fense of entrapment encompasses two elements: (1) the inducement
of the defendant into an offense by the actions and conduct of gov-
ernment agents; and (2) the lack of the defendant's predisposition to
commit such an offense.'19 The defendant has the burden of proof
regarding the first element and the government has the burden of
proof regarding the defendant's predisposition.120 Successful asser-
tion of the defense results in a verdict of not guilty even though it is
proven that the defendant committed the proscribed criminal act. 121
Two views are recognized by the federal courts regarding the oc-
114. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932); see also I W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ch. 5 (1984); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 48 (1972).
115. 223 F. 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1915) (conviction reversed on the ground of
entrapment).
116. The United States Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
117. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963). It is generally agreed that
the defense of entrapment should be applied in instances where crimes have been
"manufactured." See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
118. The basic assumption underlying the defense of entrapment is that Congress
did not intend to punish defendants who committed criminal offenses upon the in-
ducement of law enforcement authorities. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 488-91 (1976); Russell, 411 U.S. at 428-29 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375;
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
119. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 484 (focus on defendant's predisposition); Russell,
411 U.S. at 429 (focus on defendant's predisposition); United States v. Glaeser, 550
F.2d 483, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 613, 615 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504,
509 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 983 (1971).
120. This view concerning burden of proof is recognized by circuits adhering to
the bifurcated theory of entrapment. See United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510,
513-14 (2d Cir. 1977); iviano, 437 F.2d at 299.
The unitary theory of entrapment holds that a defendant has no burden of proof
whatsoever; but the government has the burden of proving that the defendant was
not entrapped. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 647 (8th Cir. 1976).
For further discussion, see infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
121. Notably, however, the defense of entrapment cannot be utilized where the
law enforcement authorities "useld] stealth, strategy, or deception to trap an 'unwary
criminal' or merely provide[d] the defendant with an opportunity or facility to com-
mit a crime." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; see Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442; see also W. LAFAVE
&J. ISRAEL, supra note 114, ch. 5; W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 114, § 48.
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currence of entrapment. The prevailing view holds that entrapment
occurs only when a government agent "implants the criminal design
in the mind of the defendant."122 This view employs a subjective
standard whereby the courts focus on the accused's state of mind.
The key issue is whether the accused was predisposed to commit the
illegal act.' 2 3 If evidence substantiates that government inducement
occurred, the defendant must be acquitted unless the government
can prove that the defendant was predisposed to engage in the illegal
acts. 1
24
The minority view holds that entrapment occurs when govern-
ment agent conduct "is of a kind that could induce or instigate the
commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it,"
even where the accused was predisposed to commit the criminal of-
fense.125 An objective standard is invoked under this view.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes the majority
view.126 During the Eighth Circuit's January, 1984 to September,
1985 term, it decided a number of cases' 2 7 where the accused sought
to invoke the defense of entrapment. Particularly intense arguments
and judicial analysis were set out in United States v. Lard 128 and United
States v. Dion. 129
122. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489; Russell, 411 U.S. at 436; see Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
123. Courts have looked to a variety of factors in determining predisposition. See
United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984) (whether the defendant
readily responded to the inducement offered; evidence of prior involvement in simi-
lar conduct); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.) (decision to com-
mit crime is own preference, not government persuasion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007
(1983); United States v.Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 604 (3d Cir.) (the "jury must deter-
mine the defendant's subjective intent"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United
States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 155 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (the degree of coercion
relative to defendant's criminal background); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d
602, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971) (whether the defendant had al-
ready formed the design to commit the crime for which he is charged): I'illiano, 437
F.2d at 299 (whether the defendant was engaged in an existing course of conduct
similar to the crime for which he is charged); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370,
374 (1st Cir. 1967) (whether the defendant has refused to commit similar acts on
other occasions).
124. Sherman, 200 F.2d at 882-83.
125. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 445 (Stewart,J., dissenting); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
126. In Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921), the Eighth Circuit first
recognized and applied the Supreme Court's majority view regarding application of
the defense of entrapment. Id. at 38.
127. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 682 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Woosley, 761 F.2d
445, 448 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Underhill, 753 F.2d 645, 646-47 (8th Cir.
1985); Leroux, 738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Randolph, 738 F.2d 244,
245 (8th Cir. 1984); trd, 734 F.2d 1290, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1984).
128. 734 F.2d 1290, 1292-96 (8th Cir. 1984).
129. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985).
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1. United States v. Lard
Lard involved a situation where two undercover agents, and a gov-
ernment informant, went out drinking with one of the accused, Lloyd
Rigsby.13 0 While these individuals were out drinking, the agents
told Rigsby that they needed some guns and asked Rigsby if he knew
anyone who had guns for sale.I13 Rigsby stated that he knew of sev-
eral individuals who might have guns for sale. Rigsby took the men
to Pete Lard's home where one agent asked Lard if his shotgun was
for sale.132 Lard stated it was not. Lard was asked if he had any
other firearms for sale. Lard responded that he only had a small det-
onator for sale.133 After examining the detonator, the agent told
Lard that it was not powerful enough.1 34 After some discussion, it
was suggested that a pipe bomb would be more suitable.'35 At this
point, the agents implored Lard that this was what they needed and,
after more discussion, Lard agreed to manufacture a pipe bomb that
evening. 136 The agents returned three hours later and picked up the
bomb. The following day, Lard's pipe bomb was detonated by fed-
eral agents who concluded that the bomb was a "destructive device"
under federal law.137 Consequently, Lard and Rigsby were arrested
and convicted.13 8 Lard appealed his convictions on entrapment
130. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1291.
131. Id.
132. Lard was an acquaintance of Rigsby's. However, Rigsby had not spoken to
Lard for several months. Id. at 1291-92. The facts surrounding the agents' meeting
with Lard were in dispute. The agents contend that when they arrived at Lard's
home, Rigsby went in alone first and after eight minutes returned and told them that
Lard had a shotgun and detonator for sale. Rigsby and Lard contend, however, that
this initial meeting never took place. Id. at 1292.
133. Id. at 1291-92.
134. Notably, Lard's initial offer to sell the detonator and shotgun shells would
not have been unlawful. Shotguns and shotgun shells were expressly excluded from
the definition of the term "destructive device" in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(0 (1982). Also,
there was no suggestion that Lard's shotgun was a "firearm" within the definition of
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). The shotgun shells clearly were not firearms. At no time did
the government suggest or attempt to establish that the small detonator that Lard
possessed was a "destructive device" as defined by § 5845(f). Nor did the govern-
ment attempt to establish that the combination of the detonator and the shotgun
shells were a "destructive device" tinder the above statute. Lard. at 1294 & n.4.
135. Id. at 1292. The facts are in dispute as to who actually suggested that a pipe
bomb be used. It was either suggested by Rigsby or Agent Anderson. Id.
136. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f) (1982); see supra note 132.
137. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1292. Lard and Rigsby were convicted of conspiring to
transfer, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) and transferring, 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1982) an unreg-
istered "firearm" (e.g. a "destructive device"). In addition, Lard was also convicted
1or making, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f) (1982), and possessing, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), a de-
structive device. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1291.
138. Lard. 734 F.2d at 1294.
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grounds. The Eighth Circuit held that Lard's convictions should be
reversed since the evidence presented demonstrated Lard's entrap-
ment as a matter of law. "No reasonable juror could have found be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Lard was ready and willing to commit
the crimes and that the agents did no more than afford him an op-
portunity to do s0."139
To establish an entrapment defense as a matter of law the Eighth
Circuit requires the defendant to prove, "[t]hat a government agent
originated the criminal design; that the agent implanted in the mind
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense; and that
the defendant then committed the criminal act at the urging of the
government agent."140 Further, the key issue to be addressed is
"whether the government agent caused or induced the defendant to
commit a crime he was not otherwise predisposed, i.e., willing and
ready, to commit whenever a propitious opportunity arose."141 In
resolving this issue, the court acknowledged "intent or predisposi-
tion" as the principal focus.142
In an attempt to rebut Lard's premise that he had been induced by
the agent to commit the proscribed crimes, the government put forth
several arguments. First, the government argued that since Rigsby
initiated the pipe bomb discussion,143 the agent could not have been
the originator of the criminal design implanted in Lard's mind to
commit the criminal act.144 The court disposed of this argument by
stating that even assuming that Rigsby made this suggestion, he
made it after the agent had repeatedly suggested that he needed
something more powerful than the detonator Lard was willing to
sell.145 The court went on to state that the agent "served as the cata-
lyst behind Rigsby's suggestion; and Rigsby merely served as the
agent's unwitting informant." 146 The court concluded that the agent
was undisputably the first to embrace Rigsby's suggestion, and the
first to give it criminal significance by soliciting Lard to sell him a
pipe bomb.147 Therefore, the agent, "not Rigsby, was the one who
implanted the criminal design in Lard's mind by soliciting him and
offering him an inducement. Had the agent not immediately fol-
139. Id. at 1293 (quoting United States v. Shaw, 570 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir.
1978)).
140. Id. AccordJannoitti, 673 F.2d at 597; United States v. Bradsby, 628 F.2d 901,
903 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. Lard, 734 F.2d at 129.
142. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1295.
143. This fact was disputed. See supra note 135.
144. Id. Had Lard sold the agent the detonator, he would not have been in viola-
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lowed through on Rigsby's suggestion, Lard would not have commit-
ted any criminal wrongdoing."148
The government argued that predisposition was evidenced by
Lard's possession of the ingredients necessary to make the bomb and
by his impressive ability to produce the bomb in a relatively short
time, apparently with no assistance or guidance.149 The court rea-
soned that these contentions were based on pure factual speculation
because there was no evidence which substantiated that Lard had the
ingredients in his possession when he accepted the agent's offer.150
In addition, the government's own expert testified that the pipe
bomb was one that did not require any special knowledge or exper-
tise. The expert further testified that this type of bomb could have
been produced in ten minutes as opposed to the three hours Lard
needed to assemble one.' 5' Consequently, the court concluded that
Lard's predisposition to commit this crime was not supported by the
surrounding circumstances. 15
2
The final argument presented by the government was one relying
on numerous other Eighth Circuit cases which hold that there is no
entrapment where the government agent merely attempts to
purchase contraband or illegal merchandise from an unsuspecting
criminal.153 The court stated that these cases did not apply to Lard
because of the agent's conduct.154 Specifically, the court held that
148. Id.
149. Id. The evidence presented stated only that Lard had a detonator and shot-
gun shells in his possession. Id.
150. Id. at 1295.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court also stated that the government had failed to prove the impli-
cation that "Lard had developed an expertise in making pipe bombs, had the neces-
sary ingredients readily available, and eagerly awaited a propitious opportunity to ply
his trade for financial gain." Id. at 1295-96.
153. Id. at 1296. See United States v. Zabel, 702 F.2d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 1983)
(defendant was not entrapped where he acted eagerly and without hesitation to con-
summate offense of interstate transportation, sale, and receipt of stolen food stamp
coupons; agents only afforded defendant an opportunity to commit an offense he was
already predisposed to commit); United States v. French, 683 F.2d 1189. 1193 (8th
Cir.) (government agent's question as to whether defendant knew if anyone was dis-
counting food stamps merely afforded defendant opportunity or facility for commis-
sion of offense of acquiring and processing food stamps in a manner not authorized
by law and was not entrapment), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); Shia, 570 F.2d at
772 (defendant was not entrapped where he failed to demonstrate a government
agent originated the criminal design; the agent implanted in the mind of the defend-
ant the disposition to commit the offense and the defendant committed the criminal
act at the urging of the government agent); Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598, 602
(8th Cir.) (since government informer did no more than inform the defendants that
he was a willing buyer, he merely afforded an opportunity and facility for the commis-
sion of the offense; entrapment did not occur), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
154. See Lard, 734 F.2d at 1296. The court noted that these cases stand for the
well-recognized proposition that no entrapment occurs where the agent merely af-
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the agent "went beyond merely providing Lard with the opportunity
to commit a crime; he ensnared Lard by implanting in him a law-
breaking disposition that was not theretofore present."55 Conclud-
ing that the agent had been over-zealous in creating this crime, the
court held that fundamental fairness precluded it from putting its
imprimatur on over-reaching conduct in law enforcement.156 The
agent's conduct instigated a criminal act by an otherwise innocent
person in an effort to lure him into illegal activity with resultant
punishment. 157
2. United States v. Dion
The decision in Dion 158 produced the same result as in Lard,
although it involved a somewhat unique set of circumstances. Dion
involved criminal prosecutions which arose out of a Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) undercover operation, Operation Eagle. This Opera-
tion was conducted to investigate the killing and selling of eagles and
other protected birds.159 This investigation took place in South Da-
kota near the Yankton Sioux Reservation.' 60 In 1980, Agent Cooper
was "actively assigned" to investigate the alleged illegal acts. 16'
With the additional investigative efforts of Agent Nando Mauldin,
substantial evidence of trafficking in protected birds had been com-
piled by August of 1982.162
Rather than prosecute the main figures involved in these illegal
activities, the government expanded Operation Eagle by "actively as-
signing" FWS Agent Robert Standish to the Operation.163 During
the summer and fall of 1982, agents Mauldin and Standish made sev-
eral visits to the Yankton Sioux Reservation representing themselves
fords the defendant with the opportunity to commit a crime. Id. This proposition
was first recognized in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
155. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1296. The court went on to state that in each of the cases
recognizing this proposition, the defendant's predisposition was evidenced by his
prior criminal activity or his "quick and eager response to the government's initial
solicitation." Id.
156. Id. at 1297. See also Russell, 411 U.S. at 428-29 (the entrapment defense pro-
hibits law enforcement officers from instigating criminal behavior by individuals
otherwise innocent in order to lure them into commission and ultimate punishment).
157. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1297.
158. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 678.
160. Id. The government stated that they first learned of possible killing of pro-
tected birds in this area in 1978 through a report submitted by FWS Agent John L.
Cooper. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Agent Mauldin corresponded and did business with five alleged suppliers
of protected birds. His investigative compilations were achieved through his holding
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as traders and art dealers in Indian crafts made from protected
birds. 164
In December of 1982, the agents purchased their first whole pro-
tected bird from Dwight Dion, Sr.,] 6 5 and at this time made their first
and only transaction with Lyle Dion, Jr.166 The agents still did not
make any arrests. Over the next few months they paid several thou-
sand dollars to Dwight Dion, Sr.167 and Asa Primeaux, Sr., 168 and
made their first and only transaction with Terry Fool Bull.169
Subsequently, each of the four individuals was tried, convicted,
and sentenced for violation of various United States statutes.' 70 Lyle
Dion, Jr. and Fool Bull appealed their convictions contending that
they were entrapped by government agents as a matter of law and
therefore, that their convictions should be reversed.171 The court
held that the government failed to meet its burden of proof, thus
requiring the reversal of Dion's and Fool Bull's convictions.1 72
Again, as was the case in Lard, entrapment was proven as a matter of
law. No reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dion and Fool Bull were predisposed, ready, and willing
to commit the crimes, and that the agents did no more than afford
them an opportunity to do so.' 7 3
With regard to Dion's and Fool Bull's contention that they had
been induced to commit the proscribed crimes by government
agents, the government presented several arguments. First, the gov-
ernment argued that Dion's and Fool Bull's predisposition had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the undercover agents
164. Id. Agents Mauldin and Standish paid thousands of dollars in cash for items
made from protected birds. Id.
165. Id. The agents gave Dwight Dion, Sr. $2,300 for four eagle carcasses. Id. at
679.
166. Id. Lyle Dion,Jr., the son of Dwight Dion, Sr., sold an eagle tail and later the
remainder of that eagle to the agents. Id.
167. Id. Dwight Dion, Sr., sold the agents four additional bird carcasses. Id.
168. Id. Asa Primeaux, Sr., sold the agents three bird carcasses. Id. Both Dwight
Dion, Sr., and Asa Primeaux sold protected birds to agents working in Operation
Eagle since the Operation's inception. Id. at 678.
169. Id. Terry Fool Bull sold the agents one bird carcass. Id.
170. Id. at 677. Each of Dwight Dion, Sr., Lyle Dion, Jr., Asa Primeaux, Sr., and
Terry Fool Bull were convicted of "taking" or "selling" eagles and other protected
migratory birds or bird parts in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Act (BGEA),
16 U.S.C. § 668-668d (1982), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 703-11 (1982) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-40
(1982).
171. Dion, 762 F.2d at 686, 690.
172. Id. at 691-92.
173. Id. at 692. Prevailing case law recognizes that in cases where entrapment has
been pled, the prosecution must prove the accused's predisposition beyond a reason-
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did no more than afford them with an opportunity to sell protected
birds to the agents.1 74 The government felt, therefore, that the
court could avoid an examination of the myriad of factors used by
the courts to determine predisposition. 175 The court refused to ac-
cept this argument because neither Dion nor Fool Bull were predis-
posed to commit the illegal acts. 176 Applying the majority view's
subjective standard, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Dion's and
Fool Bull's lack of predisposition was evidenced by the following fac-
tors: (1) neither Dion nor Fool Bull ever killed an eagle before De-
cember of 1982 even though the government claimed there was a
market in the Yankton Sioux reservation area for protected birds
prior to the onset of Operation Eagle;' 7 7 (2) both Dion's and Fool
Bull's conduct during the negotiations with Mauldin and Standish
for sale of the eagle feathers and carcasses demonstrated that they
were naive first offenders;178 (3) neither Dion nor Fool Bull sold an-
other eagle to government agents or anyone else; 179 and (4)
although both Dion and Fool Bull were impoverished, neither of
them gave in to the agent's offers until almost two years had
passed.180 Accordingly, Dion's and Fool Bull's convictions were re-
174. Dion, 762 F.2d at 685.
175. Id. Dion was directly and indirectly solicited to kill and sell eagles to Mauldin
and Standish throughout the years preceding his sale of a protected bird to the
agents in December of 1982. Indirect solicitation came from Dion's father who had
become a friend to the agents and freely sold protected bird parts and carcasses to
the agents. Id. at 686.
Fool Bull too was directly and indirectly solicited to kill and sell eagles to the
agents. Indirect solicitation came from Fool Bull's father-in-law, Asa Primeaux, who
repeatedly encouraged Fool Bull to be on the lookout for eagles or other protected
birds. This direct and indirect solicitation went on for over two years before Fool
Bull actually sold an eagle carcass to the agents in March of 1983. Id. at 690.
176. Id. at 687, 690. For a listing of various factors used by federal courts to de-
termine predisposition, See supra note 123.
177. Dion, 762 F.2d at 686, 690. The court stated that this factor was particularly
relevant because it demonstrated that while each of the accused had previously had
the opportunity to kill and sell eagles for profit neither had chosen to do so. Id. at
691.
With respect to Fool Bull the court stated this was of great significance because
he had been unemployed during most of Operation Eagle's existence. Fool Bull had
supported himself and his family on $268 in assistance per month and lived in a
dilapidated trailer home next door to his father-in-law, Asa Primeaux. Id. at 690.
178. Id. at 686, 690. Specifically, the court noted that neither Dion nor Fool Bull
seemed to know anything about the protected bird trade and each was tinable to set a
price for sale of the eagles to the agents. See id. at 691.
In particular, Dion had to ask his father how much he thought an eagle would
sell for. The court concluded that this evidence suggested that Dion was an unwary,
innocent adolescent. Id. at 689. See Lard, 734 F.2d at 1293; Townsend, 555 F.2d at 155
n.7.
179. Dion,, 762 F.2d at 691.
180. Id. at 690. The court recognized that individuals cannot claim the entrap-
[Vol. 12
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versed by the court. 18,
C. Circuit Court Comparison
In retrospect, the Eighth Circuit's analysis and conclusions in the
preceding decisions placed it in the mainstream of other circuit court
decisions concerning the applicablity of the entrapment defense.182
Application of this defense by the federal courts has resulted in areas
of consensus, significant points of difference, and some general
trends.
1. Availability of the Defense
The availability of the entrapment defense has resulted in some
significant points of difference. The majority of circuit courts have
held that the entrapment defense is not available to a defendant un-
less he admits committing the acts which constitute the offense
charged.183 The courts recognizing this view have reasoned that it is
inconsistent for a defendant to claim that he did not commit the acts
charged and to simultaneously argue that he was entrapped.184 The
Eighth Circuit is in accord with this view.185
Notably, the Fifth Circuit has recognized two exceptions to the
above view. First, an accused who denies committing the acts which
constitute the offense charged, may rely on this defense if the prose-
cution's own case injects susbstantial evidence of entrapment.' 8 6
Second, an accused who is indicted for conspiracy may deny being a
ment defense merely because they are poor and could not resist the substantial
amounts of money to be made through criminal activity. The court went on to state
that in this case, the risk of the government in offering so much money over a pro-
longed period of time, resulted in many who would never have shot a protected bird
without being enticed to do so. Id. at 689-90.
181. Id. at 690, 692.
182. For a thorough analysis of state court recognition of the majority and minor-
ity views concerning the entrapment defense, see generally Comment, Causation and
Intention in the Entrapment Defense, 28 U.C.L.A. L. RE\'. 859 n.3 (1981).
183. United States v. Rey, 706 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038
(1983); Gibson v. Lockhart, 692 F.2d 66, 68 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Annese.
631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 652-53
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980): United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d
Cir. 1979); United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411, 418 (7th Cir. 1977).
184. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
185. Gibson, 692 F.2d at 68.
186. United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1977); United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120. 138-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1976):
United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d 190, 191-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 931
(1974); Sears v. United States. 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965).
The Eleventh Circuit recognized this exception in 1Uited States v. llaimoWit:. 725
F.2d 1561, 1573-74 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984).
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party to a conspiracy and still claim that any of his overt acts resulted
from entrapment. 1
8 7
A minority of circuit courts have held that the entrapment defense
is available even though the defendant denies committing the acts
which constitute the offense charged.188 In reaching this conclusion,
these courts have relied upon one or more of the following argu-
ments: (1) the rule which generally authorizes a defendant to rely on
inconsistent defenses should apply to the entrapment defense; 189 (2)
the defenses of denial and entrapment are alternative but not incon-
sistent defenses;190 and (3) dual defenses should be allowed where,
under particular facts, proof of entrapment is not contrary or repug-
nant to proof that the defendant is otherwise guilty.'19
The issue of whether a defendant must admit or deny commission
of the acts constituting the charged crime appears to be an open
question in the Second Circuit. A number of early cases have held
that defendants who deny committing the acts constituting the of-
fense cannot rely on the entrapment defense.192 Subsequent cases,
however, have held that this issue is an open question.'
9 3
2. Burden of Proof and Jury Instructions
Issues regarding burdens of proof and jury instructions have re-
sulted in significant differences of opinion, including a relatively new
trend.
Entrapment involves two well-defined theories: the "bifurcated"
theory and the "unitary" theory.194 The bifurcated theory recog-
nizes that entrapment involves two issues: inducement and propen-
sity. Under this theory, burden of proof issues are divided between
the defendant and the government. Specifically, the defendant has
the burden of proving that the government induced him to commit
the criminal act. If the defendant is successful in this proof, then the
187. Greenfield, 554 F.2d at 182; United States v. O'Leary, 529 F.2d 1202, 1203
(5th Cir. 1976); Newcomb, 488 F.2d at 192; Marko v. United States, 314 F.2d 595, 597-
98 (5th Cir. 1963).
188. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120
(1976); United States v. Mejia, 529 F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1976); United States N.
Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1975).
189. Demnima, 523 F.2d at 985.
190. Id. at 984-85.
191. United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 269-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 104 S.
Ct. 1910 (1983).
192. United States v. Ramsey, 374 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Di Donna, 276 F.2d 956, 956 (2d Cir. (1960) (per curiam).
193. In United States v. Brown, 544 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1976), the court held that
the trial court unnecessarily decided this issue and further declared that this issue
remains an open one in the Second Circuit. Id. at 1159.
194. See generally W. IFAVE & J. ISRAI.E., Su1W note 114. ch. 5.
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government must rebut this argument by proving that the defendant
was ready and willing to commit the crime without persuasion.195
Two views concerning jury instructions are recognized under the
bifurcated theory. A minority of circuit courts have held it proper
for a trial court to give jury instructions bifurcating the entrapment
defense into two elements, allocating the burden of proof regarding
these elements between the defendant and the prosecution.'9 6 A
smaller number of circuit courts have held that it is prejudicial error
for a trial court to fail to expressly instruct the jury concerning the
defendant's burden of proof.197
The unitary theory of entrapment holds that the defendant has no
burden of proof whatsoever. The government, however, has the
burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped.198 Three
views concerning jury instructions are recognized under this theory.
The majority of circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that
a proper jury charge would indicate that the government had the
burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped.199 Other
circuit courts hold that it is reversible error for a trial court to fail to
give an instruction stating that the government has the burden of
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not
entrapped200
Notably, the Second and Ninth Circuits have begun a trend which
holds that under certain circumstances the trial court's instructions
on entrapment should not make any reference to the defendant hav-
ing a burden of proof on the entrapment issue.201
195. United States v. Lee, 634 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Berger, 433 F.2d 680,
684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1970).
196. See United States v. Tom, 640 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981); Braver;
450 F.2d at 804; Berger, 433 F.2d at 684.
197. United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1965); Gorin v. United
States, 313 F.2d 641, 654 (1st Cir.). cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963).
198. See United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 348-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 861 (1975); United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20, 25 (10th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Eddings, 478 F.2d 67, 72-73 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Harrell, 458
F.2d 655, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 846 (1972).
199. See United States v. Tornabene, 687 F.2d 312, 317 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Johnson, 605
F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1033 (1980); United States
v. Smith, 588 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1979); Gmrnle, 522 F.2d at 25.
200. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 712, 716-18 (3d Cir.
1973); Notaro v. United States. 363 F.2d 169, 172-76 (9th Cir. 1966).
201. United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1982); Pratti v.
United States, 389 F.2d 660, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Landrv, 257
F.2d 425, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1958).
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3. Rebuttal of the Entrapment Defense Through Use of
Evidence of Other Offenses
The circuit courts are in agreement that evidence of the defend-
ant's similar unlawful acts, other than the acts the defendant is on
trial for, are ordinarily admissible to rebut an entrapment de-
fense.202 Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sorrells,203
these circuits have adopted this approach. 20 4 The Sorrells Court rea-
soned that if a defendant sought acquittal through use of the of en-
trapment defense, he could not complain about an "appropriate and
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as it bears
on that issue."205
A relatively new trend has surfaced regarding this issue. Three
circuits have taken the view that to rebut a claim of entrapment, the
prosecution may introduce evidence of other offenses. This may be
done if it appears that the defendant will rely on a claim of
entrapment. 2 0 6
CONCLUSION
Comparatively speaking, much diversity surrounds the circuit
courts' applications of the entrapment defense. The Eighth Circuit,
however, has followed the majority, adopting and adeptly applying
the "subjective" standard set out in Sorrells for determining whether
a defendant has been entrapped.
Unfortunately, both the subjective and objective views fail to con-
sider the crucial issue of the defendant's intention to commit prohibited
criminal acts. Using either of these views, a court can decide a de-
fendant's guilt or innocence without directly examining any of the
essential elements of that particular offense.
Specifically, the subjective test fails to examine the defendant's in-
tent by using an overly expanded view of predisposition.207 On the
other hand, the objective test fails to recognize the defendant's in-
tent completely, by focusing exclusively on an objective standard for
202. Braver, 450 F.2d at 805; Notamr, 363 F.2d at 175-76.
203. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
204. United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
994 (1980); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77. 85 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cohen, 489 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1973): United States v. lerry, 478 F.2d 1276,
1280 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1005 (1973): Brown. 453 F.2d at 108: Pulido v.
United States, 425 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1970); United States %'.Johnson. 371
F.2d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1967); Whiting %. United States. 296 F.2d 512, 516-17 (1st Cir.
1961).
205. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
206. See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 833 (1975); Cohen, 489 F.2d a( 950: United States v. Simon, 453 F.2d 1i1. 115
(8th Cir. 1971).
207. See supra note 119.
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law enforcement conduct. Consequently, the availability of this de-
fense depends solely upon the government agent's conduct sur-
rounding the commission of the offense.208
Predisposition should be recognized and included under each
view. It should be limited, however, to the scope of the defendant's
actual intent to commit the crime, thereby making each view more
accurate in evaluating the asserted claims of entrapment. Further-
more, this modification would promote the Supreme Court's policy
underlying the entrapment defense: confinement of imposed sanc-
tions from government-induced offenses only to those who are
predisposed to commit such offenses.
Charlene W. Hatcher
208. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382,
stated: "[Ijt is wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to commit the crime
originated with the defendant or government officers .... ." Id.
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